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 LAW SUMMARY 
Are Non-Judicial Sales Unconstitutional?  
The Super-Priority Lien and Its Influence on 
State Foreclosure Statutes 
Ryan Prsha* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As part of an ongoing balancing act between the interests of mortgage 
creditors and homeowners’ associations, twenty states have implemented a 
“super-priority” lien that allows homeowners’ association dues and assess-
ments to take precedent over the property’s mortgage in the event of a fore-
closure.1  Although originally intended to give mortgage creditors an incen-
tive to pay off the association dues themselves, this lien has led to several 
unintended consequences.2  Courts have accepted the concept of non-judicial 
foreclosure.3  However, due to a federal district court decision interpreting the 
super-priority lien, the constitutionality of these sales could soon be put into 
question.4 
In 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada cited a land-
mark civil rights case from Missouri, Shelley v. Kraemer,5 and ruled that a 
private, non-judicial foreclosure sale was a state action.6  This, in turn, sub-
jected the sale to the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution7 and subse-
 
* B.S., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2017; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  This 
Note is written with much appreciation to Professor Wilson Freyermuth for guidance 
throughout the writing process, to the Missouri Law Review for editorial assistance, 
and to my family for their continued support. 
 1. R. Wilson Freyermuth & Dale A. Whitman, Can Associations Have Priority 
over Fannie or Freddie?, 29 PROB. & PROP. 26 (Jul./Aug. 2015). 
 2. JOINT EDITORIAL BD. FOR UNIF. REAL PROP. ACTS, THE SIX-MONTH 
“LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN” FOR ASSOCIATION FEES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMON 
INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT 1 (2013), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/jeburpa/2013jun1_JEBURPA_UCIOA%20
Lien%20Priority%20Report.pdf [hereinafter “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”]. 
 3. Arthur B. Axelson, Heather C. Hutchings & Alvin C. Harrell, Update on 
Mortgage Foreclosure Litigation: Mers, Standing to Sue, and “Show Me the Note” as 
Defenses, 67 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 155, 156 (2013). 
 4. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d. 1063, 1078 
(D. Nev. 2015). 
 5. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 1 (1948). 
 6. See U.S. Bank, N.A., 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1077. 
 7. See id. at 1078. 
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quently put in jeopardy the concept of non-judicial foreclosure.8  Although 
this decision’s effect is currently confined to the State of Nevada, there are 
nineteen other states, including Missouri, that have yet to make a decision on 
how to handle the super-priority lien.9  If Nevada’s Shelley justification is 
invoked in the remaining district courts, there could be widespread implica-
tions for all non-judicial foreclosure statutes across the country. 
Part II of this Note discusses the background necessary to understand 
the super-priority lien and its constitutional implications in regards to non-
judicial foreclosure.  Part III reviews the recent developments that have given 
rise to this issue.  Part IV discusses the ramifications of the manner in which 
the super-priority lien is being handled and how the court’s methodology 
could potentially affect the constitutionality of non-judicial foreclosure. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In order to fully understand the implications that the super-priority lien 
has created for non-judicial foreclosure, it is necessary to discuss the predi-
cates on which the issue stands.  This Part will first examine the foreclosure 
process and how it relates to the super-priority lien.  Next, it will explore the 
constitutional grounds that the district courts have relied on, including the 
concepts of state action and non-judicial foreclosure. 
A.  The Basics: What Is a Lien and How Does It Work? 
A lien is a notice attached to a property informing others that the proper-
ty titleholder owes a creditor money, and the property has been put up as col-
lateral for the debt.10  If the owner fails to pay back what is owed, the credi-
tor11 may foreclose on the property and use the proceeds of the sale to pay off 
what is left of the balance.12  If more than one lien is put on the property, each 
lien is given a priority order in which the debt will be paid off.13  The debt 
with the higher priority is the senior lien, and those with lower priority are 
considered its junior.14  As soon as a senior creditor forecloses, all subordi-
 
 8. See generally id. 
 9. MO. ANN. STAT. § 448.3-116.2(3) (West 2016). 
 10. Lien, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 11. When a creditor holds the benefit of the lien, he or she may also be referred 
to as a lienor.  Lienor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 12. See Nick Timiraos & Alan Zibel, Reviews Begin for Borrowers Disputing 
Foreclosures, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2011) 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203707504577012130274478996. 
 13. Amy Loftsgordon, Foreclosure, Liens, and the First in Time, First in Right 
Rule, ALLLAW, http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/foreclosure/liens-first-time-right-
rule.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
 14. Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166, 173 
n.4 (D.C. 2014). 
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nate junior liens on that property are effectively extinguished.15  However, 
when a junior creditor forecloses, all senior liens remain intact.16  Therefore, 
while a junior creditor can still foreclose, the new buyer receives the property 
already burdened by the senior liens.17  Consequently, any property fore-
closed by a junior creditor is worth less than market value because the new 
buyer must pay off all senior liens to clear title.18 
The priority order of liens is well established under a combination of 
equitable jurisdiction and statutory law.19  Real estate taxes owed on the 
property always take first priority.20  Historically, any mortgage on the prop-
erty will take first priority after the taxes have been paid off.21  Inevitably, all 
other liens fall somewhere further down the priority pecking order.22  On 
paper, this system makes a great deal of sense.  The mortgage providers typi-
cally have much more capital invested in the property than any of the other 
creditors, so it is logical to prioritize their debt.  In practice, however, several 
issues have developed with junior liens – especially those imposed by home-
owners’ and condo associations. 
B.  The Role of Association Dues and Assessments 
Homeowners’ and condo associations typically assess periodic dues on 
each property within their boundaries.23  Depending on the property, the fees 
can range from just a few hundred dollars per month, to thousands of dollars 
over that span.24  These dues are used for a variety of purposes that provide 
the community with both visual benefits, such as general neighborhood 
 
 15. 7912 Limbwood Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 979 F. Supp. 2d 
1142, 1149–50 (D. Nev. 2013). 
 16. How Does Lien Priority Affect Me?, FORECLOSURE U., 
http://www.foreclosureuniversity.com/studycenter/freereports/lien_priority.php (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
 17. Id. 
 18. James L. Winokur, Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The “Super 
Priority” Lien and Related Reforms Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership 
Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 358–59 (1992). 
 19. See Schroeter Bros. Hardware Co. v. Croatian “Sokol” Gymnastic Ass’n, 58 
S.W.2d 995, 1001 (Mo. 1932); see also Huggins v. Hill, 236 S.W. 1051, 1053 (Mo. 
1921) (en banc). 
 20. Priority of Mortgage and Tax Liens, 10 REAL ESTATE CTR. 1110, 1110 
(1996) (revised in Oct. 2005), 
https://assets.recenter.tamu.edu/documents/articles/1110.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 1. 
 24. See The Average HOA Dues, GEEKS ON FIN., 
http://www.geeksonfinance.com/info_8775420_average-hoa-dues.html (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2016). 
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maintenance, and invisible benefits, such as property insurance for common 
areas.25 
Because an association’s source of revenue is usually limited to com-
mon assessments, the surrounding residents of the community bear the con-
sequences of default by a property owner of his or her assessment obliga-
tions.26  In the event of a default, the association must either increase the fees 
for the remaining property owners or reduce the maintenance and services it 
provides.27  Neither option is ideal, and as the months pass without payment, 
it becomes increasingly harder for the surrounding property owners to bear 
the weight of the cost.28  In an attempt to mitigate this hardship, a unit or par-
cel within an association’s boundary becomes subject to a lien in the amount 
of unpaid dues.29  This lien, although vital to the continued operation of the 
association, is typically junior to the property’s mortgage.30 
Because of the low priority, it is tremendously difficult for an associa-
tion to foreclose on its lien.31  Any rational potential buyer would be fright-
ened by the prospect of paying off the remaining mortgage just to receive 
clear title.32  Subsequently, the associations must typically wait for the senior 
mortgage provider to foreclose on the property in order for it to collect its 
debt.33  If the mortgage foreclosure takes a long period of time, or if the fore-
closure proceeds are inadequate to pay off the mortgage, then the association 
will once again be forced to bear the cost of the unpaid dues.34 
These delayed and inadequate proceedings have become more common 
in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis.35  In a soft housing market, 
mortgage creditors have an incentive to delay foreclosure in hopes of getting 
greater value from the property when the market recovers.36  Additionally, 
 
 25. Shannon Ireland, Why You Shouldn’t Hate Your Homeowners Association 
Dues, ZILLOW (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.zillow.com/blog/dont-hate-hoa-dues-
184748/. 
 26. Winokur, supra note 18, at 359. 
 27. Id. at 359–60. 
 28. Id. at 359. 
 29. “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 1. 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Winokur, supra note 18, at 358–59. 
 32. Id. 
 33. “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 2. 
 34. Winokur, supra note 18, at 358–59. 
 35. “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 5.  The FHFA has published fore-
closure timelines for all fifty states, showing the “periods within which . . . servicers 
are expected to complete the foreclosure process for mortgages that did not qualify 
for loan modification or other loss mitigation alternatives.”  Id. at n.3 (quoting State-
Level Guarantee Fee Pricing, 77 Fed. Reg. 58991, 58992 (proposed Sept. 25, 2012)).  
The average timeline across the nation “is 396 days, ranging from 270 days (a com-
mon timetable in nonjudicial foreclosure states such as Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota 
and Missouri) to 750 days in New Jersey and 820 days in New York.”  Id. 
 36. Id. at 5. 
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delaying foreclosure allows the lender to avoid the legal obligation to pay off 
the ever-growing amount of unpaid association dues and assessments that 
have accrued.37  The consequences of the existing priority system, which 
incentivize the mortgage provider to delay foreclosure, have proven to be 
“devastating to the community and the remaining residents.”38  Under this 
system, the mortgage provider can sit back and watch its collateral continue 
to be preserved by the various community-enhancing efforts of the surround-
ing property owners.39  The lender is essentially receiving an unfair value “to 
the extent that [it] enjoys this benefit by virtue of a conscious decision to 
delay . . . foreclosure.”40 
C.  The Creation of the Super-Priority Lien 
Twenty different states have attempted to mitigate this unfair value by 
creating a super-priority lien status for association dues.41  In these states, the 
fees owed to an association take priority over the mortgage, typically for up 
to six months worth of outstanding payments.42  Some states, such as Mis-
souri, have statutes that only apply to condominium associations.43  Others, 
such as Nevada, have created statutes that apply for up to nine months of 
unpaid dues for any type of homeowners’ association.44  Despite these differ-
ences, the underlying motivation behind and subsequent implication of each 
statute remains fairly consistent from state to state.45 
For practical reasons, the associations’ whole lien could not take priority 
over a mortgage.46  The principle justification was that “complete priority for 
association liens could discourage common interest community development 
. . . [because] [t]raditional first mortgage lenders might be reluctant to lend 
from a subordinate lien position if there was no ‘cap’ on the potential burden 
of the an [sic] association’s assessment lien.”47  Therefore, the super-priority 
statute drafters were forced to come up with “an equitable balance between 
the need to enforce collection of unpaid assessments and the obvious necessi-
ty for protecting the priority of the security interests of lenders.”48  Drafters 
have generally struck this balance with a six to nine month period.49  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 6. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. MO. ANN. STAT. § 448.3-116.2(3) (West 2016) (this provision is part of Mis-
souri’s Uniform Condominium Act). 
 44. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2) (West 2016). 
 45. See “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 2–4. 
 46. Id. at 2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST CMTY. § 3-116 cmt. 1, U.L.A. (1994). 
 49. “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 3. 
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The drafters’ primary assumption in striking this balance was that “if an 
association took action to enforce its lien and the unit/parcel owner failed to 
cure its assessment default, the first mortgage lender would promptly institute 
foreclosure proceedings and pay the prior six months of unpaid assessments 
to the association to satisfy the limited priority lien.”50  This would permit the 
mortgage lender to maintain its priority lien position and convey clear title in 
its foreclosure sale.51  The failure of this theory ultimately leads to the non-
judicial foreclosure issue that forms the crux of this Note. 
D.  The Basics of Non-Judicial Foreclosure 
As stated above, when a property owner defaults on a loan in which the 
property was collateral, the creditor can foreclose on said property in order to 
recover the debt owed.52  In most states, the primary method for creditors to 
collect their debt involves a process known as non-judicial foreclosure.53  As 
the name suggests, non-judicial foreclosure does not require court action.54  
Instead, some minimal level of notice must typically be given to all interested 
parties before the sale can happen.55  Once this notice requirement has been 
fulfilled, the property is auctioned off to the highest bidder.56 
Since non-judicial foreclosure is a statutory creation, its notice require-
ment is handled differently from state to state.57  In many states, such as Mis-
souri and Nevada, a creditor that is non-judicially foreclosing on a property 
must give actual notice to any interested party that has “opted into” the notice 
requirement.58  Regardless of the state, the level of notice required generally 
does not live up to the procedural due process requirements of the Constitu-
tion, which would require the foreclosing party to provide notice that is rea-
sonably calculated to alert concerned parties of the action and to give those 
 
 50. Id. at 4. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Kylee Gloeckner, Nevada’s Foreclosure Epidemic: Homeowner Associa-
tions’ Super-Priority Liens Not So “Super” for Some, 15 NEV. L.J. 326, 327 (2014). 
 54. Id. at 327–28. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 328. 
 57. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 998–
99 (5th ed. 2007); see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 
(1950). 
 58. Missouri statute requires that “[a]ny person desiring notice of sale under any 
deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale upon real property may, at any time 
subsequent to recordation of such deed of trust or mortgage, cause to be filed for 
record in the office of the recorder of each county in which any part or parcel of the 
real property is situated a duly acknowledged request for such notice of sale.”  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 443.325 (2000); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.090.3 (West 
2016). 
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parties an opportunity to object.59  However, because these non-judicial fore-
closures are private, not state, actions, the notice requirements of the Consti-
tution are not implicated.60  Because there is no constitutionally guaranteed 
right to procedural due process in the context of a private action, it is com-
pletely up to the states to decide where to set the notice requirement.61  Alt-
hough widely accepted, this premise has recently been questioned due to the 
District Court of Nevada’s interpretation of the super-priority lien.62 
The specifics of this development will be explained in full detail in Part 
III, but it is important to first understand the predicate on which this chal-
lenge to non-judicial foreclosure’s notice requirement is based: the state ac-
tion doctrine. 
E.  The State Action Doctrine 
A state action is “[a]nything done by [the] government[, such as] . . . an 
intrusion on a person’s rights . . . by a governmental entity.”63  Once some-
thing is considered a state action, it is subject to the due process requirements 
of the Constitution under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.64  Therefore, 
there is a significant notice requirement for any action considered a state ac-
tion, a requirement not present for actions that are private.65  Consequently, 
classifying a transaction as state action has tremendous implications in re-
gards to how to execute a sale.66 
 
 59. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15. 
 60. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process protections are not implicated unless state action is involved, as private action 
is not subject to due process restraints).  Contrary to popular belief, the Constitution 
generally applies only to the government.  Barring an exception, private activity is not 
subject to the due process requirements of the Constitution.  Without the distinction 
between private action and state action, the Fourteenth Amendment state action re-
quirement becomes irrelevant.  Donald M. Cahen, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer 
on the State Action Concept, 44 CAL. L. REV. 718, 720 (1956). 
 61. Even prior to the super-priority issue, there was a push among legal scholars 
to reform non-judicial foreclosure on a national level as a Uniform Nonjudicial Fore-
closure Act.  However, this has gotten very little attention from legislators and the 
judiciary.  NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 57, at 996.  This will be discussed further 
in Part IV. 
 62. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. 
Nev. 2015). 
 63. Gregory K. Laughlin, Digitization and Democracy: The Conflict Between the 
Amazon Kindle License Agreement and the Role of Libraries in a Free Society, 40 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 3, 50 n.264 (2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting State Action, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). 
 64. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 530 
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011). 
 65. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 16. 
 66. U.S. Bank, N.A., 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1076. 
7
Prsha: Are Non-Judicial Sales Unconstitutional?
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
924 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Typically, the Constitution’s guarantee of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment applies only to actions of the government and its agents.67  
However, this “blanket rule” is subject to a few exceptions.68  One of these 
exceptions, known as “entanglement,” allows the Due Process Clause to ap-
ply as long as the government actively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates 
private conduct that would otherwise violate the Constitution.69  When these 
situations arise, the government must either stop associating with the private 
entity, or the private entity must start complying with the Constitution.70   
As discussed later in this Note, a U.S. district court has recently used the 
state action doctrine to create a heightened notice standard for homeowners’ 
associations when foreclosing on a super-priority lien.71  The court was able 
to do so because of the landmark 1948 civil rights case out of Missouri, Shel-
ley v. Kraemer.72  In Shelley, the Supreme Court of the United States effec-
tively struck down all racially restrictive covenants on real estate.73  The 
Court held that private parties could not seek judicial enforcement of the cov-
enants because any enforcement by the courts would constitute a state ac-
tion.74  This would have made the enforcement a discriminatory state action 
via the entanglement exception, and such state action would have violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.75  
The Court ultimately concluded that the “action of state courts and of judicial 
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”76 
The Supreme Court decided Shelley in the 1940s, well before the other 
famous victories of the civil rights movement.77  During this period, there 
was immense pressure on state governments to uphold racially restrictive 
 
 67. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 519. 
 68. Id. at 521. 
 69. Id. at 539. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See U.S. Bank, N.A., 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1081. 
 72. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 73. Id. at 23. 
 74. Id. at 20. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 14. 
 77. Although implementation of the Shelley rule was clearly the correct and 
necessary measure to take back in the 1940s, the passing of time has changed its ne-
cessity.  In the decades since Shelley, the federal government implemented the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968.  See Fair Housing Act of 1968, §§ 42 U.S.C. 3601–3619 
(2012).  By striking down racially restrictive covenants, the Fair Housing Act ren-
dered the Shelley holding practically irrelevant.  The case still stands as good law, 
though, so the justification used by the court and the subsequent rule created remain 
intact.  Cahen, supra note 60, at 718.  Many of the inconsistencies that appear in the 
use of the state action doctrine reflect the changing social realities from 1948 to the 
present day.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 522. 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss3/13
2016] ARE NON-JUDICIAL SALES UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 925 
covenants due to the intolerant racial norms of the time.78  Because of this, it 
was left to the federal courts to render them unconstitutional.79  The Shelley 
ruling allowed courts to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to situations that 
were only state actions under “color of law,” which ultimately helped forge 
the entanglement exception to the state action requirement.80  The idea behind 
the “color of law” doctrine was to allow the courts to grant protection when 
state officials were “so clothed with governmental power that they can effec-
tively deprive persons of rights guaranteed under the fourteenth amend-
ment.”81  However, this doctrine needed to be extended even further to cover 
Shelley, since the landlords in that case were not state officials.82  The activi-
ties of individuals cannot violate the Fourteenth Amendment by themselves; 
the Shelley ruling therefore took racially restrictive covenants from “non-
constitutional grounds” and made their enforcement in court a matter of state 
action, subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.83  Although 
this rule has not gone forgotten since the time of Shelley, it has been applied 
sparingly and inconsistently.84 
Recently, this same premise – that a judicial enforcement of an action 
between two private parties constitutes a “state action” – has been used to 
justify a notice requirement for the non-judicial foreclosure of a super-priority 
lien.85  This notice requirement has placed non-judicial foreclosure statutes in 
peril. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The super-priority lien drafters’ intention was to create an incentive for 
mortgage lenders to pay off monthly association dues while they waited to 
foreclose on a property.86  It was the drafters’ belief this would keep the re-
maining homes within the association from taking on the burden of unpaid 
dues, with minimum inconvenience to the lender.87  However, the mortgage 
service providers did not always act as expected and often continued to let 
 
 78. See Abigail Perkiss, Shelley v. Kraemer: Legal reform for America’s neigh-
borhoods, CONST. DAILY (May 9, 2014), 
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/05/shelley-v-kraemer-legal-reform-for-
americas-neighborhoods/. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Cahen, supra note 60, at 719. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 83. Cahen, supra note 60, at 723–24. 
 84. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
 85. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1074–75 
(D. Nev. 2015). 
 86. “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 87. Id. 
9
Prsha: Are Non-Judicial Sales Unconstitutional?
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
926 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
dues go unpaid.88  This became an issue when the neglected associations de-
cided to actually use their super-priority liens to foreclose on the defaulted 
property.89 
A.  An Unintended Drawback of the Super-Priority Lien 
Although the super-priority lien has existed since 1976,90 only recently 
was its true meaning put into question.91  In SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. 
Bank, a homeowners’ association attempted to foreclose on a property after 
its dues and assessments had gone unpaid.92  This action caught the mortgage 
provider off guard.93  It was previously assumed that the super-priority lien 
existed as a quasi-requirement for lenders to pay off the association dues but 
held no true priority over the mortgage.94  However, in this case, the Supreme 
Court of Nevada ruled that a super-priority lien is, in fact, a true lien that al-
lows an association to sell a property with clear title.95 
Determining that the super-priority lien allowed an association to sell 
property clear of the mortgage was just the start.  The typical prospective 
buyer – frightened of purchasing a mortgage-burdened home – no longer 
posed an obstruction to an association’s decision to foreclose.96  This ulti-
mately resulted in associations having the practical ability to foreclose on 
properties without the bank taking any action.97  Although the Supreme Court 
of Nevada had established the true meaning of the super-priority lien, the 
process in which associations could actually perform super-priority foreclo-
sures was still up in the air.98  In states with non-judicial foreclosure statutes, 
foreclosure sales did not require the associations to go through the court sys-
tem.99  Instead, an association could initiate a sale by recording a notice of 
default and privately auctioning the home to a third-party bidder.100  The min-
imal notice required to execute a sale under a non-judicial foreclosure statute 
led to the troubling circumstances in U.S. Bank v. SFR Investments Pool 1 – a 
second Nevada case between the same parties.101 
 
 88. Id. at 5. 
 89. See SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014). 
 90. “LIMITED PRIORITY LIEN”, supra note 2, at 2. 
 91. See SFR Invs. Pool 1, 334 P.3d at 412. 
 92. Id. at 409. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 412. 
 95. Id. at 419. 
 96. Winokur, supra note 18, at 358–59. 
 97. See generally SFR Invs. Pool 1, 334 P.3d at 408. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 417. 
 100. Gloeckner, supra note 53, at 328. 
 101. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. Nev. 
2015). 
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B.  Longstanding Precedent Applied in a Novel Context 
In U.S. Bank v. SFR Investments Pool 1, defendant SFR bought a 
$236,000 house at a non-judicial foreclosure sale for a mere $9000 after the 
property’s homeowners’ association foreclosed using Nevada’s super-priority 
statute.102  This sale effectively wiped out hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
mortgage debt owed to the plaintiff, U.S. Bank,103 which allowed SFR to 
become the burden-free owner of the home.104  The foreclosure was proper 
under Nevada’s non-judicial foreclosure statute and notice requirements.105  
U.S. Bank nonetheless attempted to challenge the validity of the sale.106 
U.S. Bank brought an action to invalidate the homeowners’ associa-
tion’s sale due to a lack of notice.107  It was the bank’s position “that because 
the [non-judicial foreclosure] statutes do not require junior lienors to be given 
notice of an impending HOA foreclosure sale that might extinguish their 
liens, junior lienors in such circumstances are deprived of the fundamental 
right to notice protected by the . . . Fourteenth Amendment.”108 
 
 102. Id. at 1068. 
 103. Id.  U.S. Bank is the service provider of the mortgage for the property in 
question.  The recent developments with the super-priority lien specifically deal with 
mortgages handled by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) and its service 
providers.  The FHFA is an independent regulatory agency responsible for the over-
sight and conservatorship of the government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.  See Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, FED. FIN. HOUSING AGENCY, 
http://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/FannieMaeandFreddieMac (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2016).  The goal of these enterprises is to magnify the secondary mortgage 
market by securitizing mortgages in the form of mortgage backed securities so that 
the lenders can then reinvest their assets into more lending.  Julia Patterson Forrester, 
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to 
Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1082–83 (2007).  This subsequently increases the 
amount of lenders in the mortgage market and boosts the economy.  Id. at 1106–07.  
Essentially, Fannie Mae (or Freddie Mac) will buy up a number of mortgages and 
pool them all together and then sell parts of that pool to investors who get paid based 
on those homeowners paying their mortgage statements.  Id. at 1081.  However, some 
of the larger financial institutions, such as U.S. Bank, will often act as the service 
provider for these mortgage pools.  Id. at 1080.  It is the service provider’s job to 
manage and administer each of the numerous mortgages in the pool.  Id. at 1082–83.  
This responsibility includes foreclosing on any defaulted mortgages and keeping track 
of any and all obstacles between the mortgage pool and its profits.  Id. at 1086.  De-
pending on the size of the pool, this can be a fairly burdensome and problematic task.  
Id. at 1086–87.  In return for performing these responsibilities, the service provider 
receives a percentage of the profits made from the mortgage pool.  Id. at 1104. 
 104. U.S. Bank, N.A., 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1068. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1075. 
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In response, SFR filed a counterclaim for a declaration that the associa-
tion’s foreclosure sale of the property was valid and therefore extinguished 
U.S. Bank’s deed of trust under Nevada’s super-priority lien statute.109  Be-
cause it was a private sale, SFR believed that Nevada’s non-judicial foreclo-
sure statute rendered the super-priority sale lawful regardless of notice.110  
The facts of the case are interesting, but it is the method the district court 
used to strike down the sale that ultimately threatens the constitutionality of 
non-judicial foreclosure statutes as they are currently composed. 
The court held SFR’s claim should be dismissed because court enforce-
ment of the non-judicial foreclosure sale constituted a state action, which 
subsequently subjected the participants to the full due process protection of 
the U.S. Constitution.111  U.S. Bank’s claims, meanwhile, were not subject to 
this same scrutiny and therefore were allowed to proceed.112 
The court justified the difference in the way it handled each party’s 
claim using the state action rule created in Shelley v. Kraemer.113  The U.S. 
Bank court summarized the essence of Shelley in the following way: “When a 
state permits a private actor to use the machinery of government to deprive 
another private actor of his constitutional rights, the first actor may in some 
cases be treated as a state actor for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”114 
In regard to SFR’s attempt to validate the association’s foreclosure sale, 
this court decided that U.S. Bank may use the Shelley rule to “invoke the 
Fifth Amendment against this Court’s potential declaration that SFR owns the 
Property free and clear of U.S. Bank’s interest based on SFR’s compliance 
with certain state statutes governing the notice process if those statutes do not 
comport with due process.”115  The court compared SFR’s use of the judicial 
system to enforce potentially unconstitutional state statutes against U.S. Bank 
to the way the “neighboring homeowners in Shelley sought to invoke the 
power of the state courts to enforce the constitutionally problematic cove-
nants against the Shelleys.”116 
In regards to U.S. Bank’s attempt to invalidate the sale, the court held 
that “it [was] U.S. Bank itself, not SFR, who ask[ed] the Court to adjudicate 
the validity of the potentially constitutionally problematic statutes.”117  There-
fore, it decided that Shelley could not apply because “U.S. Bank cannot com-
plain of the threat of impending judicial action that it has itself demanded.”118  
Otherwise, the court noted that “the rule of Shelley could be combined with a  
 109. Id. at 1068. 
 110. Id. at 1077. 
 111. Id. at 1081. 
 112. Id. at 1082. 
 113. Id. at 1076–77. 
 114. Id. at 1076. 
 115. Id. at 1078. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1077. 
 118. Id. 
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declaratory judgment action by any plaintiff to avoid the state-action re-
quirement under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments” and therefore “convert 
any private action into state action simply by asking a court to declare that the 
private action would be unconstitutional if it had been a state action.”119  As 
will be discussed in detail in Part IV, the implications of these developments 
could potentially extend far beyond the minutiae of super-priority lien fore-
closures and into the constitutionality of non-judicial lien foreclosures in gen-
eral.120  If this is the case, the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act 
(“UNFA”) will be of fundamental importance. 
C.  The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act 
In recent years, there has been a strong push by legal scholars to imple-
ment the UNFA in order to promote efficiency and fairness in the foreclosure 
process.121  The UNFA would require actual notice to all persons whose 
property rights are put at risk by foreclosure.122  It would additionally provide 
an opportunity for any other interested person to request notice of foreclosure 
as he or she wished.123  It was the drafters’ belief that these notice provisions 
would appeal to lenders, while affording borrowers a variety of special safe-
guards if they act responsibly.124 
Although the UNFA has received a great deal of praise from legal 
scholars, the act has struggled to take hold with legislators at all levels.125  
Conveniently, recent concerns with the super-priority lien could change the 
minds of many legislators as they consider the act. 
 
 119. Id. at 1077–78. 
 120. This is not the first time that the state action doctrine has created cause for 
concern.  Past cases dealing with the entanglement exception have been considered a 
“conceptual disaster area,” and the Supreme Court itself has admitted that the “cases 
deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model 
of consistency.”  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 521 (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., 
Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967)).  Part of this problem arises from the fact that the gov-
ernment is involved in almost all private conduct to some degree and in some capaci-
ty.  Id. at 522.  Because of this, a state action requirement necessitates somewhat 
arbitrary lines to be drawn to establish its existence.  Id.  The civil rights cases from 
the 1940s utilized and relied on the rule to attack the unnervingly abundant discrimi-
nation of the day.  Id. at 530.  However, most of the cases since the civil rights 
movement have failed to acknowledge the Shelley rule’s existence.  Id.  The civil 
rights cases that relied on the Shelley rule are still good law, but they have rarely been 
followed since.  Id.  Therefore, there is a strain amongst the decisions that allow the 
arbitrary application of the rule in U.S. Bank v. SFR Investments.  Id. 
 121. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 57, at 996. 
 122. Id. at 999. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1002. 
 125. Id. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
The recent developments with the super-priority lien suggest that invo-
cation of the Due Process Clause is required any time a party seeks judicial 
validation of a non-judicial foreclosure on a lien.126  If this holds true, it raises 
questions about the constitutionality of any state non-judicial foreclosure 
statute in which the notice requirement does not satisfy constitutional due 
process requirements.  Although the implication of the Shelley rule in the 
context of non-judicial foreclosure is currently confined to the state of Neva-
da,127 there are nineteen other states, including Missouri, that have yet to 
make a determination on how to handle the super-priority lien.128  If Nevada’s 
Shelley justification is invoked in the remaining district courts, there could be 
serious consequences for non-judicial foreclosure statutes across the country.  
State non-judicial foreclosure statutes have needed reform for some time 
now, and the unusual circumstances created by the super-priority lien may be 
the catalyst necessary for change. 
Foreclosure statutes that require an interested party to “opt in” before he 
or she is required to be given notice129 of the proceedings are, at the very 
least, constitutionally suspect.  These statutes essentially allow a senior credi-
tor to foreclose on a property in which multiple entities have an interest with-
out notice to those parties solely because those parties failed to fill out the 
request.  The constitutionally guaranteed right to due process should not be 
taken away solely because the person or entity failed to take an affirmative 
action.  Although these fairness issues are inherent in the statutes themselves, 
it was not until the courts were forced to confront super-priority lien foreclo-
sures that they were able to find a legal justification for striking down the 
unfair sales.130  The Shelley holding essentially gives the courts a backdoor 
route to striking down private sales that were constitutionally unfair but still 
valid as a private action sale due to the relaxed statutory notice requirements. 
While the end result of classifying non-judicial foreclosure as state ac-
tion is positive – raising the notice requirement makes the system exponen-
tially fairer – the U.S. Bank court’s decision to invoke Shelley and the state 
action rule is not the ideal way to bring about this change.  Giving private, 
non-judicial sales full constitutional protection could have several unintended 
drawbacks.  The Shelley rule, as interpreted in light of the super-priority lien, 
establishes a principle so broad that it could, in theory, turn anything into a 
 
 126. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1072 
(D. Nev. 2015). 
 127. Id. at 1067–78. 
 128. The basis of which will come down to Missouri courts’ interpretations of 
section 443.327.  MO. REV. STAT. § 443.327 (2000). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See U.S. Bank, N.A., 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1063. 
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state action with a simple lawsuit.131  Any court that does not find a state ac-
tion has impliedly sustained the violation of whatever right is being chal-
lenged.132  Without limitations on the Shelley rule, an incredibly wide range 
of private conduct could become actionable under the Constitution.133 
Without the distinction between private action and state action, the 
Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine becomes irrelevant.  Both the 
initial drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment and the subsequent historical 
context of the U.S. legal system stress a separation between the two.134  If 
private actions become subject to the stringent Fourteenth Amendment re-
quirements, then the rights of private citizens to conduct their own business at 
arm’s length is put in jeopardy simply due to the ever-present possibility of a 
lawsuit premised off a flimsy procedural defect. 
The court handled the super-priority issue in the best way it could within 
its power.  Allowing actual foreclosure after the default of a super-priority 
lien was necessary to save the interests of the homeowners’ associations, and 
ultimately striking down the unfair U.S. Bank sale was necessary to protect 
the lenders.  However, affirming the concept of private-turned-state action 
simply because a court enforced the sale is problematic.  There needs to be a 
limit on the court’s interpretation of Shelley in order to keep the intended and 
necessary distinction between private and state action.  Otherwise, private 
actions will be subject to the heightened standards required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, ultimately distorting the underlying prem-
ise and intended scope of the amendment. 
A better approach would be for legislators to simply raise the level of 
notice required for non-judicial foreclosure up to the point where it satisfies 
the Due Process Clause.  With this approach, the courts would not have to 
worry about rendering unfair non-judicial foreclosures invalid for reasons of 
procedural due process under the Constitution.  They would simply point to 
the requirement of the statute and render the sale invalid for not living up to 
the stated requirements.  Had the legislators written a non-judicial foreclosure 
statute that lived up to the Constitution, the only thing the courts would have 
to do is decide if a particular sale followed the statutes.  Because the legisla-
tors have failed to enact a satisfactory law, the courts were forced to invoke 
Shelley so that they could strike down a grossly unfair sale as unconstitution-
al. 
Regardless of whether the law actually does require constitutional pro-
tections of due process for private non-judicial foreclosures, basic notions of 
fairness demand that any person whose rights may be destroyed by a foreclo-
 
 131. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 540 (“Shelley remains controversial because 
ultimately everything can be made state action under it.”). 
 132. Id. at 540–41 (noting that “[a]ll private violations of rights exist because state 
law allows them”). 
 133. Id. at 542. 
 134. See generally Cahen, supra note 60, at 732–36. 
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sure should have a certain level of notice in advance of the proceeding.135  
The integrity of the non-judicial foreclosure process requires acknowledge-
ment of necessary analogous protections – even if those are not judicial. 
If Missouri and other super-priority lien states were to change their stat-
utes to conform to the Due Process Clause, the new statute could potentially 
look a lot like the UNFA.  Implementing the UNFA would not only create a 
uniform standard of foreclosure, but it would also take the constitutionally 
suspect non-judicial foreclosure process and bring it within the bounds of 
constitutional due process.136 
Non-judicial foreclosure is not covered in the Constitution – it is a crea-
tion of statute.137  The only reason the courts need to resort to the state action 
doctrine is to prevent foreclosure sales like the one in U.S. Bank.  If the stat-
utes were written in a way that complies with the Constitution in the first 
place, courts would strike down these outlandish sales as a violation of the 
statute rather than needing to invoke Shelley. 
Regardless of whether or not these non-judicial foreclosure sales should 
truly be classified as state actions, it is in everyone’s best interests for the 
statutes to create a procedure that is as fair as possible.  Implementing non-
judicial foreclosure statutes that comply with the Due Process Clause would 
encourage fairness and uniformity within the system without requiring the 
courts to fall further down the slippery slope of the Shelley doctrine. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The courts here deal with a difficult situation.  They must enforce the 
super-priority statutes as true senior liens with foreclosure power in order to 
protect the homeowners’ associations.  However, enforcing these foreclosures 
under most states’ non-judicial foreclosure statutes encourages exceedingly 
unfair U.S. Bank-type sales for creditors.  In order to try and find an equitable 
balance, the U.S. Bank court used the state action rule from Shelley v. Kraem-
er to classify the unfair sale as unconstitutional.  Although this adequately 
addresses the issue with super-priority liens, these recent developments have 
taken the Shelley rule in a dangerous direction, where its over-application 
seems inevitable. 
This entire issue could easily be avoided by enacting non-judicial fore-
closure statutes that comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  If this happened, a court dealing with an unfair super-priority 
sale could simply strike the sale for not complying with the statute, rather 
than making a dangerous constitutional argument.  Nineteen states have yet to 
encounter this issue, but it is only a matter of time before the validity of non-
judicial foreclosure is put to the test in these venues. 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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